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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
ULTIMINIO ZAMORA, 
Defendant/Appe.l,J dtit 
uase ih .:Uu-!01 " 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE UF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of one count of 
aggravated kidnaping and three cour 11s of aggra ,? ated sexua] 
assault, al] first degree felonies (R. 128-30) . This Court has 
j u r i s d i c t i o i 1 o v e r 1:1 1 e a p p e a 1 p i i r s u a i 11 t : 11: i e p ::> I i r o v e r p r o v i s i o n 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (West 2004) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
D:i d d e f e n s e coi i n s e 3 perforro i neffective] y by not requesting 
defendant's presence or objecting to iid s absence during the voir 
dire questioning of a juror in the judge/s chamber? 
Did the trial court comm.it plain error by permitting voir 
dire of a prospective juror :i n chambers without first ensuring 
that defendant had waived his right to be present during t:l: le 
questioning? 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must demonstrate 
that the trial court erred, that the error should have been 
obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). These claims embody a "common standard," 
in that they both require a showing of prejudice or harm. State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is 
dispositive. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated kidnaping 
and four counts of aggravated sexual assault, all first degree 
felonies (R. 2-5). He was bound over on the aggravated kidnaping 
charge and three of the aggravated sexual assault charges (R. 23-
24). A jury convicted him, and the court sentenced him to four 
fifteen-year-to-life terms in the Utah State Prison, with counts 
one and two running consecutively and counts three and four 
running concurrently with the other two (R. 128-30). The court 
credited defendant for time served and ordered him to pay $2500 
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in fees, plus any counseling costs incurred by the victim and her 
family (Id.). Defendant filed a timely appeal (R. 134). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Fifteen-year-old Beatriz, the victim, was just leaving her 
mother's home around 7 p.m. on October 15th to visit a friend, 
when her sister's husband drove up and offered her a ride (R. 
158: 15-16). Once on their way, defendant told Beatriz he was 
going to stop at a motel where some people were drinking (Id. at 
16). He asked if she wanted to stop with him, and she said yes 
(Id. at 17) . 
Defendant drove to a room at the nearby Capitol Motel on 
State Street (Id. at 63). No one was there. Defendant told 
Beatriz that people were coming, so they sat down, had a beer, 
and talked (Id^ at 17-18). 
Eventually, Beatriz decided it was time to go and got up to 
leave (Id. at 19). Defendant, however, told her that she could 
not leave and blocked the door with his body. When she tried to 
push her way out, he forced her back, onto the bed, and ordered 
her to undress (Id.). She refused. He then took her clothes off 
and raped her (Id. at 20-21). She testified that when she asked 
him why, he said it was her sister's fault: 
I told him why was he doing it? He told me 
because my sister, that she took everything 
away from him and she made life so bad for 
him that he was going to do it to her. 
Id. at 20. Beatriz testified that when she tried to get away, 
defendant choked her "to where I couldn't breathe" (Id.). She 
-3-
also stated: "I could hear somebody in the next room and I tried 
to scream and he'd cover my mouth and start choking me" (Id.). 
To keep Beatriz quiet, defendant forced her to take cocaine, 
which he was also using along with alcohol (Id. at 20, 23). 
Beatriz testified, "It made me feel like I - I don't know, I just 
couldn't feel anything, like I was just numb" (Id. at 23). She 
said the drug made her "just lay there. When it would start to 
wear off[,] I would start to scream again" (Id. at 23-24). 
A few hours into the ordeal, defendant raped Beatriz a 
second time (Id. at 22, 27). He also penetrated her digitally 
and forced her to put his penis in her mouth (Id. at 22; R. 159: 
116). After the sun rose the next morning, defendant threatened 
to kill Beatriz (Id^ at 24). 
Beatriz's ordeal finally ended when the motel manager 
knocked on the door around 11 a.m. to announce check-out time 
(Id. at 25). At that juncture, defendant drove Beatriz home, 
where she reported defendant's crimes to her family. They took 
her to the hospital and called the police (Id. at 25). 
A forensic nurse who examined Beatriz that afternoon 
reported that Beatriz's injuries were consistent with the events 
she had described (R. 159: 118-20) . Beatriz had bite marks and 
red and purple bruising on her throat; evidence of capillaries 
bursting on her neck; bruising on her left upper arm, right 
wrist, left calf, under her eyes and on her cheeks and posterior; 
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and four sites of vaginal injury, including one large vaginal cut 
consistent with a fingernail (Id. at 112-13, 115-17, 120). 
Defendant's estranged wife tried unsuccessfully to help the 
police find him. She testified that she did not see or hear from 
defendant after the date of these crimes (Id. at 54-56). A 
childhood friend of defendant's, who had rented the motel room 
because defendant said he had no money, also testified that he 
had not seen defendant since October 15th (Id. at 58-59). 
Finally, the general manager of a restaurant at which defendant 
briefly worked testified that defendant left his employment 
abruptly in mid-October and did not pick up his last paycheck 
(Id. at 90) . 
Three years later, police located defendant in Georgia and 
extradited him back to Utah (R. 159: 126). Defendant claimed 
that he did not commit the crimes against Beatriz and that he was 
in Mexico at the time, having been deported on September 9th of 
that year (Id^ at 130, 134). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts on appeal that his counsel performed 
ineffectively by failing to request defendant's presence or 
object to his absence at the in-chambers voir dire questioning of 
one juror. In a related argument, because he did not preserve 
his claim below, he contends that the trial court committed plain 
error by permitting the voir dire to proceed without defendant 
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either being present or expressly waiving his right to be 
present. 
To prevail under either ineffective assistance of counsel or 
plain error, defendant must establish that he suffered prejudice. 
And, to demonstrate prejudice in the context of voir dire, 
defendant must show that his ability to gain the information 
necessary for the informed exercise of his right to challenge the 
juror was "substantially impaired." 
Defendant has failed to make the required showing. When the 
juror responded to a question with a potentially problematic 
answer, the court asked him three follow-up questions. 
Apparently satisfied with the responses, the court then accorded 
defense counsel the opportunity to ask additional follow-up 
questions. Counsel, similarly satisfied, declined. Moreover, 
defendant has nowhere articulated what he would have asked or 
what he might have learned, had he been present. He merely 
speculates that his presence would have led to more information. 
Where the court did not restrict voir dire and where 
defendant only speculatively asserts harm, defendant has failed 
to demonstrate that his ability to glean information necessary 
for the informed exercise of his right to challenge the juror was 
in any way impaired. Defendant's claim thus fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE NOR DID THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR 
WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS ACCORDED EVERY 
OPPORTUNITY TO GLEAN THE 
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO EVALUATE 
THE POTENTIAL JUROR 
Defendant asserts two related arguments. First, he contends 
that his counsel performed deficiently by failing "to request the 
defendant's presence or to object to his absence during the jury 
voir dire conference in judge's chambers" (Br. of Aplt. at 24). 
He asserts that he was prejudiced because empaneling the juror 
"likely . . . had a profound effect in jury deliberations to the 
detriment of [defendant's] case" and because "his constitutional 
right to be present. . . is of such magnitude that any violation 
should not be considered harmless" (Id. at 27)-1 
Second, defendant contends that the trial court committed 
plain error when it permitted voir dire to proceed in chambers 
without defendant either being present or expressly waiving his 
right to be present (Id. at 21). To allege prejudice, he asserts 
that the "biased responses from a prospective juror certainly 
would have influenced [defendant's] decisions regarding the use 
1
 Contrary to defendant's assertion, this Court has clearly 
stated: "[A]ny error made at voir dire must be prejudicial to 
require reversal." Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, 5 27, 71 
P.3d 601, cert, denied,773 P.2d 338 (Utah 2003) (citation 
omitted). 
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of for cause or peremptory challenges to remove said juror" (Id. 
at 24). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a 
showing of both objectively deficient performance and prejudice. 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-11, 12 P.3d 92. A claim 
of plain error requires a showing of obvious legal error and 
prejudice. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
As to ineffectiveness, defendant's claim of deficient performance 
presumes that he had an absolute legal right to be present during 
supplemental, in-chambers voir dire. The State, however, does 
not concede that defendant had such a right. See State v. 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 533, 48 P.3d 953 (declining to analyze 
whether cited authorities "are so broad as to guarantee a right 
to be present during sidebar discussions between the court and 
the prospective jurors").2 Similarly, as to plain error, the 
alleged error could not have been obvious to the trial court 
2
 The supreme court in Hubbard assumed, "without deciding 
the issue, for purposes of this appeal," that defendant had such 
a right, but that he waived it by failing to assert it. Hubbard, 
2002 UT 45, 1133-34. The court stated, "[A] defendant knowing of 
a discussion must assert whatever right he may have to be 
present." Id. at 534 (citing United States v. Gaqnon, 470 U.S. 
522, 528 (1985)). Here, defendant concedes that no objection was 
made to his absence at voir dire. See Br. of Aplt. at 22. 
Accordingly, to circumvent the waiver doctrine, he brings his 
claim under the rubric of plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
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because the law nowhere explicitly holds that defendant had an 
unfettered right to be present.3 
In any event, the Court need not resolve this question 
because defendant's claim so clearly fails on the common 
prejudice prong. "When defendant raises the issues of both plain 
error and ineffective assistance of counsel, a^ common standard 
is applicable.'" State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 
1992)(quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 
1989)); accord State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 
1994). "Because the defendant must show prejudice to prevail 
under either argument, the ^common standard' . . . functions as 
an analytical shortcut that avoids treatment of the other prongs 
of the ineffective assistance and plain error standards." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at 131 n.14. 
This Court has noted that the traditional concept of 
prejudicial error "is impossible to apply in the context of voir 
dire questioning." Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 
App. 1993). This Court explained in an analogous context: 
An appellant claiming that the trial court's 
unreasonable limitation of voir dire 
substantially impaired his ability to 
exercise peremptory challenges simply cannot 
prove, in the traditional way, that prejudice 
resulted from the error. Appellant cannot 
show with any certainty that had certain 
questions been asked, particular responses 
3
 Moreover, even assuming the law did so hold, the court 
would have no way of knowing, based on the record before this 
Court, that defendant objected to his attorney handing the 
proceeding without him. 
-9-
would have been received; that certain jurors 
would then have been challenged for cause or 
peremptorily; and that particular, more 
favorably predisposed jurors would have been 
seated instead, who would have deliberated to 
a different result. Accordingly, in this 
context, we apply the test enunciated in 
Hornsby: Prejudicial error is shown if the 
appellant's right to the informed exercise of 
peremptory challenges has been "substantially 
impaired." 758 P.2d [929] at 933 [Utah App. 
1988]. 
Id. 
Defendant here cannot prevail on his claims of ineffective 
assistance and plain error because he has not, and cannnot, 
demonstrate that he did not have an adequate opportunity to gain 
the information necessary to evaluate the juror to whom he now 
objects. Id. at 102-03. The juror in question, Mr. Erickson, 
was one of five jurors individually called into chambers for 
"more personal questions outside the presence of the other 
jurors" (R. 163: 39). The court called Mr. Erickson in because 
he responded affirmatively to a query about whether he had been a 
victim of sexual assault or knew such a victim (Id. at 48). 
After explaining the circumstances that prompted his response, 
Mr. Erickson engaged in the following colloquy with the court: 
The Court: This is a separate independent 
case. Do you think you can sit in 
judgment . . . and put that kind of 
out of your mind and judge — 
Juror: Yeah. 
The Court: — [defendant] independently of 
anything that previously happened? 
Juror: I think sor yeah. 
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The Court: 
Juror: 
The Court: 
Juror: 
The Court: 
Juror: 
The Court: 
Juror: 
The Court: 
Juror: 
The Court: 
Do you believe in your mind that 
[defendant] is innocent until 
proven guilty? 
Yes, I do. 
Do you feel that [defendant] has 
any obligation to you to prove his 
innocence? 
Is that not why we're here? 
Yeah. But do you understand that 
he has no obligation to prove his 
innocence, the State has the 
obligation? 
All right, yeah. 
Do you understand that? 
Yeah. 
Do you have any problem with that? 
I do not. 
[Defense Counsel], do you have any 
follow-up questions? 
Defense Counsel: No, Judge. 
R. 163: 49-50 at addendum A. 
Under the factual circumstances of this case, defendant's 
ability to glean, through his counsel, the knowledge necessary to 
effectively exercise his right to challenge the juror was not 
impaired. When Mr. Erickson suggested that defendant might be 
obliged to establish his own innocence, the court immediately 
pursued his possible misconception by asking three follow-up 
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questions to clarify the prospective juror's thinking.4 See 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988) (once statements 
made during voir dire raise question of partiality, court should 
investigate further and either find the inference rebutted or 
remove the juror). Mr. Erickson's unequivocal responses to the 
court's final two rehabilitative inquiries indicated that he 
fully understood the burden of proof and accepted it willingly. 
See R. 163: 50 at addendum A. Once the court satisfied itself 
that the juror was not biased, it then accorded defense counsel 
the opportunity to ask additional clarifying questions. Id. 
Defense counsel declined the invitation. Id. 
Under these circumstances, where the court did not restrict 
voir dire in any way, defendant had every opportunity to glean 
the relevant information necessary to evaluate whether Mr. 
Erickson should serve on the jury. Moreover, defendant has not 
proffered what he might have asked had he been present that his 
counsel failed to ask. See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 
(Utah 1996) (speculative claims cannot be substituted for proof of 
prejudice). Nor has he suggested what he would have learned if 
he had been present that his counsel did not learn. Id. He 
merely speculates that his presence might have given him 
4
 Defendant cites the court's query, "Do you feel that 
[defendant] has any obligation to you to prove his innocence?" 
and the juror's "somewhat equivocal" response, "Is that not why 
we're here?" (Br. of Aplt. at 24). Defendant makes no mention, 
however, of the court's next three rehabilitative queries or of 
his counsel's opportunity to ask additional follow-up questions. 
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unspecified but dispositive information. In short, defendant has 
not demonstrated that his ability to exercise his challenges was 
in any way impaired by his absence from chambers. 
Indeed, there was no basis for a challenge for cause, and 
had defense counsel wished to exercise one of his peremptory 
challenges, he certainly could have done so. Consequently, 
having failed to establish prejudice, defendant's claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error both fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for one count each of aggravated kidnaping and three 
counts of aggravated sexual assault, all first degree felonies. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this p( I day of January, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
c JM^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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